Where the investigation led us:
- – Wagner Group: the long arm of the Kremlin – The two leaders of the Russian paramilitary group and the photo with Putin in 2016 – When it was founded, in which countries it has intervened, and the US sanctions against Prigozhin
- – Wagner member’s testimony: “We got 5,000 rubles ($88) for each ISIS member we would kill” – “They offered me 150,000 rubles ($2,600) a month, while in my city I was getting 15,000” – “We went to Latakia, Syria, on a chartered plane, posing as civil engineers”.
- – For the serious injury of a mercenary, the agreed compensation with Wagner was 900,000 rubles ($16,000), while for the relatives of those who would die on the battlefield, the company promised 3 million rubles ($53,000)
- – Blackwater: changing names after civilian killings – How it started in 1996, its leader, and its first government contracts for Iraq, Afghanistan
- – In 2001 Blackwater’s first contract of just $737,000 with the US federal government – By 2006, government contracts had soared to $593.6 million.
- – How it expanded and began trading oil and minerals in Africa, and built up a force in Somalia to fight pirates in the Gulf of Aden – In 2021 TIME magazine revealed it had a $10 billion plan to build weapons
- – In which countries private armies are based – The most important “contractors” worldwide
- – The concerns of the UN and the Red Cross
by Vassilis Galoupis
It was about a decade ago that the business of private armies began to get out of control. The “industry” then began not only to grow but also to change form. The business of hiring private soldiers had already grown into a global trade worth $100 billion by 2012 alone, according to the United Nations.
The growth of the private army industry was mainly driven by Western governments who wanted to reduce the political costs of their official armies in foreign territories. Supply also came mostly from the West, with 70% of the companies being British or American.
However as the major conflicts ended, private armies began to pursue new fields of action. According to America’s National Defense University, a growing part of the client base is industries spreading into unstable parts of the world.
As the market “opened up”, non-Western companies also wanted a piece of the pie, such as Russia’s Wagner. Although its relationship with the Kremlin was heavily rumored in previous years, it was never formalized by either side. It was, however, recently confirmed in the most official way, following the failed “guerrilla” campaign by the leader of the paramilitary group, Yevgeny Prigozhin, against Vladimir Putin.
Private armies, this virtual privatization of military violence, are counting colossal profits, ever-increasing, but also huge issues of control and accountability. Questions like “Are they accountable to justice?” and “Under what institutional framework do they operate” remain unanswered by the international community.
Mercenaries are cheap and offer enormous flexibility. They go where regular armies cannot, they can do any “dirty” job and when they die there is no political or other cost. They make it convenient for governments to engage in conflicts where they can officially claim they are not involved. They allow states to increase their military presence in declared or undeclared wars without having to declare casualties, thus making it easier to maintain public support.
Wagner Group: the long arm of the Kremlin
The Wagner group first appeared in 2014 during Russia’s invasion and annexation of Crimea. This entity was not registered as a legal entity anywhere in the world. For the law, the Wagner Group was “invisible” internationally.
According to Russian law, mercenaries are illegal. The Kremlin never confirmed that Wagner was under its control. Until at least a few weeks ago…
In addition to Ukraine, Wagner has a proven track record of involvement in Syria, Libya, the Central African Republic, Sudan, Mali, and Mozambique. Its use as a private army of contractors, undertaking “jobs” on behalf of the government, became a critical part of the Kremlin’s foreign policy to expand Russian power abroad.
Two were the bosses of the Wagner team. Dmitry Udkin, a retired Russian army officer, is considered its founder and the man who gave it its name. In December 2016, Lt. Col. Udkin was photographed at a reception in the Kremlin with Putin.
Born in Ukraine in 1970, Udkin was a special forces brigade commander of Russia’s military intelligence directorate. He retired in 2013 to work for a private military company called Moran Security Group. In 2014, he founded Wagner and thus became a key, although unofficial, Kremlin official.
Wagner’s other “boss” is Yevgeny Prigozhin, a St. Petersburg businessman dubbed “Putin’s chef” by the Russian media because of his extensive restaurant and catering operations.
The US Treasury Department has already imposed banking and travel sanctions on Prigozhin in recent years for his involvement in Moscow-based Evro Polis, an oil and general marketing company. Evro Polis won energy concessions in Syria in exchange for military support.
Over the years, Pirigozin built an entire multinational commercial enterprise to finance his military operations and used a global network of corporate lawyers to fend off Western authorities.
After his recent aborted march to Moscow, Prigozhin, “in exile” in Belarus, is expected to be severely “cornered” by the Kremlin, which will make sure to rein in the money-making machine for the Wagner leader.
Wagner member’s testimony: “They gave me 150,000 rubles a month, while I was getting 15,000” – “My motive was financial, not patriotism”
Although most mercenaries are reluctant to talk to the press, in January 2018 Newsweek conducted a phone interview with a Wagner “soldier”.
The man gave only his first name (Sergei). He said he was a 30-year-old driver from Donetsk, Ukraine, and an undercover Wagner mercenary. He said he was recruited for “service” in Syria in 2015 and was already fighting as a volunteer in the pro-Russian forces in Donetsk.
“My main motivation was money, not patriotism,” Sergei said in the interview:
“Most people go to earn money. We were offered 150,000 rubles a month ($2,600 according to the exchange rate with currencies in 2018), while in my city, Donetsk, we felt lucky if we made 15,000 rubles.”
Sergei revealed that he and other recruits flew to Latakia, Syria, in a chartered plane, posing as civil engineers. He claimed that he quickly found himself in tough battles, the training he was given was “pretty basic” and the discipline very strict: “If anyone was caught drinking, the whole unit would be fined.”
“$88 for every dead ISIS member”
The company paid 5,000 rubles ($88) per head to any mercenary who killed any member of the Islamic State (ISIS) organization, according to Sergei.
For the case of serious injury to the mercenary, the agreed compensation with Wagner was 900,000 rubles ($16,000), while for the relatives of those who would die on the battlefield, the company promised 3 million rubles ($53,000). As far as Sergei knew, none of the mercenaries were cheated out of their pay.
Between 2015-2017, Wagner Group deployed about 3,000 of its “soldiers to Syria, according to the Conflict Intelligence Team, an investigative intelligence group from Russia.
Since then, the number of its mercenaries has grown significantly, almost ninefold. When he announced the “march” in Moscow, Prigozhin said he commanded “25,000 soldiers.”
“War” between Russian ministries over control
In January 2023, the US declared that it would designate Wagner as an “international criminal organization”.
Wagner’s relationship with the Russian government has not always been a given, as was the case after Prigozhin’s “attack” on Moscow. Franz Klintsevich, deputy head of the Defense and Security Committee of the upper house of the Russian parliament, stated five years ago that ways were being sought to make Wagner part of official Russian plans, but without success. The invasion of Ukraine in 2022 seems to have loosened the hands of lawmakers to include Wagner in the Russian military. This, moreover, is reportedly the reason for Prigozhin’s opposition.
Klintsevich made no secret of his concern in 2018: “We should use the example of the US and integrate private military companies into our planning. But we are failing to pass the necessary laws because of a conflict between the Ministry of Defense and the Federal Security Service over who controls such military groups. They have heavy weapons, so there’s a security issue with their regulation.”
“The Americans use military contractors all the time. Why shouldn’t we?” asked Sergei Zheleznyak, deputy head of the State Duma’s Foreign Affairs Committee, at the same time.
Blackwater: Why it changes names
The US private military giant is Academi, formerly Blackwater and Xe Services. The company decided to change its name after being tried as Blackwater for the deaths of 17 civilians in Iraq in 2007. In 2009-11 it was renamed Xe Services. Then Academi. In 2014 it merged with another private paramilitary company, Triple Canopy. The companies are now owned by Constellis Holdings.
Until 2012 over 90% of Academi’s business came from governments, but with the “opening” of the market it began to find clientele from large industrial companies.
To meet the changing demand, in fact, that year it was also to open a new training site of “several thousand acres” in East Africa, as the Economist revealed at the time.
The founder of Blackwater, the world’s most notorious private army, is Eric Prince. The son of a powerful Michigan family involved in auto parts companies, Prince was originally an officer in the US Navy before founding Blackwater the day after Christmas 1996 and effectively from the beginning of 1997. The private military started at a training center for military personnel in North Carolina, which opened in 1998.
State conventions for the protection of diplomats
It was 9/11 and the following years that turned Blackwater into a gold mine, through government contracts to protect diplomats in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as other military agreements.
In 2001 the contract with the US federal government was $737,000. By 2006 Blackwater’s government contracts had ballooned to $593.6 million.
Blackwater also had a partnership with the CIA providing logistical and transportation support and even assistance with drone strikes in Pakistan. Former top CIA officials such as Kofer Black and Robert Reacher ran Blackwater’s internal intelligence arm, as revealed by the British Guardian in November 2013.
The “Baghdad massacre” and imprisonment
Between 2005 – 2007, Blackwater security personnel were involved in 195 shooting incidents in Iraq. In 163 of these incidents, Blackwater personnel fired first.
On September 17, 2007, a group of Blackwater mercenaries unprovoked killed 17 civilians and wounded 20 others in a crowded square in Baghdad.
For this massacre, some of the mercenaries were sentenced to years of imprisonment in America. The Baghdad massacre in Nisour Square sparked an international outcry over the use of mercenaries in war. In October of that year, the congressional hearings process began. Included in the testimony was the admission that Blackwater was charging the US government $1,222 per day per guard.
In 2020 Donald Trump pardoned four security guards from the private military company Blackwater who were serving prison sentences for killing 14 civilians, including two children in Baghdad in 2007. In the meantime, and within a murky legal framework, the company had also agreed to pay $7.5 million in fines to the US government, but without admitting guilt after claiming it was acting at its behest.
In the wake of these murders, Blackwater lost a $1 billion contract to guard US diplomats and officials in Iraq. But the company was renamed and the money kept flowing.
The Obama administration awarded major contracts to Blackwater to provide security in conflict zones. Eric Prince expanded and began trading oil and minerals in Africa. He assembled a private army for the Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi and created a force in Somalia to fight pirates in the Gulf of Aden.
In Afghanistan, he contracted out many of the functions of the US Army. Beginning in 2006, he air-dropped weapons and supplies for the U.S. military in Afghanistan.
In 2021, TIME magazine revealed that he had a $10 billion plan to build weapons and create a private army in Ukraine. According to the publication, he wanted a large chunk of Ukraine’s military-industrial complex, including factories that make engines for fighter jets and helicopters to create a “vertically integrated air defense consortium” that would generate $10 billion in revenue and investment.
During the Trump administration, Eric Prince’s sister, Betsy DeVos was appointed Secretary of Education.
The UN, the Red Cross, and fast-growing companies
As far as is known to date, the largest known contractors, apart from the aforementioned, who provide upgraded military-type services of interest protection – security – training – crisis response to governments and/or large corporations (oil installations, etc.), are:
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– France: GEOS, founded in 1997
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– Germany: Asgaard, established in 2007
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– Russia: ENOT Corp, established in 2011
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– Russia: Patriot, year of establishment 2018
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– Turkey: SADAT, year of establishment 2012
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– United Kingdom: Aegis Defense Services, year of establishment 2002
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– Dubai: Erinys, established 2001
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– USA: Unity Resources Group, year of establishment 2000
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– United Kingdom: G4S, established in 2004
Governments do not currently seem willing to open the debate on how to deal with the activities of the rapidly growing private army service companies.
Only recently have we started to see a mobilization because the Ukrainian authorities and human rights groups, who are concentrating their efforts on seeking justice, are trying to link the joint Russian-Wagner action for trial, before an international court, to the charge of war crimes.
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), however, had sounded the bell for private armies many years earlier. As early as 2008 it was already compiling reports on the activities of mercenaries. It hosted reports of incidents in Baghdad by Blackwater:
“Iraqi eyewitnesses said guards entered the roundabout stopping traffic. They then shot at a white sedan that failed to slow down. According to these accounts, the car burst into flames, killing the occupants. An eyewitness said that Blackwater executives fired a rocket or grenade at the car.”
The ICRC has stressed in subsequent reports the need for a Code of Conduct for Private Security Providers. Its voices have so far gone unheard, as did the UN in its own report on private armies in 2018, focusing on human rights abuses.
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