- Why while they were dropping billions on the tracks, the security systems were missing the train.
- While EUR 5 billion was given in capital increases for OSE, EUR 12 billion in debt write-offs, over EUR 4 billion in co-financed projects already from the first CSF, and the Mitsotakis government was constantly announcing the launch of projects through public-private partnerships and a Recovery Fund exceeding EUR 4 billion, the EUR 100 million for traffic management systems was never given.
- What the contractors lost from the delays on the railroad, they earned from the highways they built themselves.
By Aris Hadjigeorgiou
The prosecutorial, technocratic, and communication “storm” planned by the government to restore its profile after the tragic accident in Tempi, began with the fiasco of the resignation within 24 hours of the “central” member of the Special Investigation Committee Athanasios Ziliaskopoulos. The resignation was replaced by Professor Christos Pyrgidis, who was successfully assigned to investigate the railway accident in Adendros in 2017.
However, this immediate resignation gave a strong blow to the prestige of the investigation process as it “stepped” on the rotten ground that the government itself created, leaving the railway without an accident investigation body for three years. The members of the body that operated until 2020 left at the end of their term and the new body was created by law just a month ago, depriving the railway system of that tool that could propose measures to deal with any incident, more or less serious, recorded during this period and were “red flags” for the deadly accident last week – the bloodiest of all time in Greece.
The burden is now expected to fall on the division of responsibilities around the causes that caused the delay of 23 years in the installation of modern telecommand-signaling systems that could have prevented the disaster. According to information, the Prosecutor is expected to soon start calling, in addition to those directly involved in the accident, a number of executives from ministries and rail operators. And a large part of the questions is estimated to relate to the contracts through which the installation of the systems was unsuccessfully attempted.
Government officials believe that, in this way, the government’s narrative will be confirmed in practice, that the responsibilities for this unthinkable delay are timeless, concern many different governments with a special weight to that of Syriza, while the current government made an effort, but simply did not have the time. The main problem of this narrative, however, is the responsibility of the current government for the tragic understaffing of OSE that left it operating high-speed trains with a manual system, without even sufficient numbers and trained traffic regulators, such as the already accused station master of Larissa.
The inconceivable adventure of contracts around modern systems of safe traffic management condenses all the troubles of public works. Public bodies that quarrel with each other. National contractors who first consort and then quarrel with international companies. The signing of contracts without approved studies. Objections, appeals, countless extensions, supplementary contracts, recapitulative statements, changes of supervisors, and requests for lost profits.
The signaling allows the railway system to automatically identify which sections of the line are occupied by lighting red lights. Telecommand handles track changes in an automated manner. Once these systems have been installed and are operational, the interoperable European Train Control System (ETCS) can be put into operation, which can even automatically stop a train if it “reads” that danger is imminent and this is the prerequisite for Greece to join the European Rail Traffic Management System (ERTMS) that began to be studied at the end of the 1980s.
The main contractors for the installation of these systems are two: 10005 which started in 2007 with Terna and THALES as contractors and the 717 of 2014 with Tommy (of the then AKTOR group) – Alstom. Parts of the first systems, however, had already begun to be installed through other contracts as early as 2000 while at the same time contracts 10004 also of 2007, 563/2009 (Terna), 635/2013 (AKTOR-AVAX-TERNA) were “running” and in 2021 a supplementary contract of 717, the 717/1. However, the majority of these contracts included projects other than signaling-telecommand. This makes it difficult to calculate the financial cost for these projects alone, but estimates put it well above EUR 100 million.
The above contracts were not awarded by OSE but by its subsidiary ERGOSE and somewhere here the first problems begin as for many years there was a particularly nebulous regime for the temporary and final acceptance of the projects between the two bodies. There are different explanations for these problems. The prevailing scenario, however, starts from the result and the “who benefits” from the huge delay and the incomplete maintenance in the intermediate gaps.
So, those who benefit from the permanent lag of the Greek railway are its competitors. That is the motorways that were built all the previous years with concessions and toll collection. Not by chance, the same manufacturers-concessions (Terna, AKTOR-AVAX) of the motorways work for the railway. They can therefore delay projects that would bring more revenue for the railroad, and to achieve this there are a thousand different ways. In the face of such expediency, it is understood that they should ensure the complicity of the political system.
But let us return to the basic conventions concerning signalling-telecommand-ETCS. The 10005 started with a deadline of completion in 2012, it already counts 16 years of implementation and before the accident in Tempi, it was not expected to be completed before the end of 2023. The 717 was launched in 2020 but together with its complementary 717/1, it was marked by the conflict between the members of the consortium, TOMY, and ALSTOM. TOMH collaborated with the French giant to secure the know-how in the special telecommunications/IT projects required.
It turned out, however, in retrospect that things were not so simple. The northern part of Platis Imathias, which was mainly taken over by ALSTOM, progressed faster, while the southern part (including the Tempi area) was dramatically delayed. Tommy reportedly tried to use materials from other companies after it had secured the “loan experience” of the French, and a fierce controversy ensued. The Financial Control Committee found in its conclusion that studies were carried out by companies with no specific signaling experience as well as an inadequate definition of the subject of the contract during the auction, “due to deficiencies in the final study”. TOMH demanded multi-million-dollar compensation for ERGOSE’s delay in disposing of the construction sites. At the same time extensions and supplementary contracts were approved. The problematic context was exacerbated by three other factors:
- – The theft of materials, metal structures, and cables exposed by any form of artisans. These thefts were attributed to the deactivation of parts of the network on which signaling telecom had started operating after 2008. The collapse was finalized around 2012 and led to the 717 recovery contract in 2014.
- – The rapid evolution of technology during these years, in combination with incomplete studies, resulted in the supply of systems that did not “snap” with the previous ones.
- – The lack of a contract between the State and OSE provided for by the European Directive 34 of 2012 “on the creation of a single European railway area”. Under that directive, a contract had to be drawn up under which the OSE would operate with specific objectives and timetables and be subsidized according to their achievement.
Two weeks before the accident in Tempi, Greece was referred to the European Court of Justice by the European Commission after having been notified in December 2020. In the same communication, the Commission stressed that the contract, which was delayed by 11 years, was “particularly important for the transparency of projects”.
Obviously, the cost of more than EUR 100 million of traffic management projects is a very small fraction of the billions spent on the rail in recent years.
It is estimated that 5 billion euros were given to capital increases for OSE, 12 billion euros to debt write-offs, and more than 4 billion euros to co-financed projects already from the first CSF, while the current government constantly announced the launch of projects through public-private partnerships and a Recovery Fund of more than 4 billion euros.
And it is most tragic the irony of the failure to complete the task that would prevent human error and save so many lives on the night of February 28, 2023.
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